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Book Review

The Way o/the Lord Jesus, Volume III: Difficult Moral Questions, by
Germain Grisez. Quincy, IL, Franciscan Press, 1997, xxxi+927 pp.
Hb $35.
This is a big book. In general, a book requires a good excuse to swell to
such dimensions, but in this case the reason seems proportionate. The book
consists of a short introduction followed by two hundred particular moral
cases, followed finally by two appendices. So, though the book is initially
intimidating, it is not necessary to wade through all nine hundred pages
before looking at the question that interests you. After reading the
introduction (which is essential to understanding the book), one can browse
or dip, select any question without having to read any other. This book in
fact proves remarkably accessible, in many ways the most accessible of the
series thus far, for it takes people where they are, with particular moral
questions or dilemmas, and in a very short space develops the moral
considerations relevant to finding some practical solution.
Some might doubt the benefits of such a project. Surely every
moral question is unique and particular practical problems cannot be solved
from some simple manual. People have to make their own decisions from
their own perspectives and there is no way that all of those details could be
known in advance. Would it not be better to stop at the general level, with
Christian moral principles, and let people work out the details for
themselves? This objection fails to see the point of these moral questions.
It is not that readers are expected to be presented with exactly this case, but
that they need to learn how to deal with individual cases, often difficult
cases. The importance of this book lies not in its answers but in its
working. The only way to learn how to solve problems is to look at
particular examples and apply, for oneself, the relevant moral principles.
The main strength of the book is in the method used to approach
these problems.
This combines a sophisticated understanding of
cooperation (as set forth in the two appendices) with a great flexibility in
the principles applied to differing cases. Dr. Grisez is not a man in the grip
of a theory. Rather, the scope of his account of basic goods and modes of
responsibility gives room for a diversity of goods and principles to be
discovered in the individual case. So the general theory is open to
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refinement as particular cases show the need for other principles of
responsibility or of judgment. The rejection of a single simple scale frees
the presentation to genuine openness about the principles required in
different cases. There is not here some apparently simple calculus used to
rationalize decisions made on other grounds (as in the case of all quasiutilitarian moralists). There is rather a genuine attempt to understand the
variety of goods, circumstances and principles relevant to each case.
It is instructive to compare this work with that of earlier casuists.
One difference immediately stands out. There is, in this volume, scarcely
any attention paid to the probability of different opinions. An earlier
generation of casuists concerned themselves excessively with which
opinions were licit for Catholic moralists to hold. To defend any particular
judgment, appeal was made to the opinion of various doctors (such as
Aquinas, Vitoria, or de Lugo). If an opinion could find sufficient support
among such doctors it was rendered probable. Concern then focused on
whether any act could be undertaken if it was supported by some degree of
probability, or whether only a more probable opinion could be acted on .
Obviously all this abstracts from the actual goods or principles at stake, and
interprets moral theology as a set of Church rules. Grisez characterizes this
approach as legalism, and his presentation is completely free of legalism in
this sense. His authorities are the gospel and the goods and principles
which constitute reasons for acting or desisting from action. He refers to
the documents of the Church only when they are relevant. His reasons are
open for examination and can be accepted, rejected, or modified.
The other feature that most distinguishes this treatment of moral
difficulties from previous treatments is its form. This volume consists not
in cases described in the third person and then analyzed in the third person .
Rather it consists in a number of requests for advice and the subsequent
replies. " Each case is presented by a conscientious person with a real
moral problem who wants a reasonable answer to the question: What
should (or may) I do?" (p. xxiii). This form is adopted no doubt because
the first person reflection (What should I do?) is thought to be the basis of
practical reason. Still another reason also shapes this form . The requests
for advice are clearly thought of as a model for those who have some
pastoral care, and may be asked for such advice. "This perspective - that
of the conscientious person deliberating - should be adopted by a moral
advisor asked questions like those in this book" (p. 849). The book is
"intended primarily for use as a seminary text or instructional resource" (p.
xv), that is, it is a text for advisors. This, in part, explains the form.
The form chosen in the book is, I think, the root of its major failing.
The form aims to accomplish two things, but ends up falling between two
stools. The replies are thought of as though they were actual replies to real
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characters (that is, in some pastoral situation). Yet of course the
formulating of such a reply, on the basis of the question (thought of
perhaps as a letter), is long distant from real personal engagement. No
doubt this is a pleasant corrective to the non-directive "never ask questions,
never give advice" school of counseling, but it cannot pass for a real
pastoral engagement. The person himself (or herself) needs to be led
gently to come to his (or her) own mind . This takes delicacy and time, and
is a cooperative venture. During this there will be occasions for speaking
clearly and for challenging or refusing to accept some false compromise,
but even in this case it is a judgment of prudence when and how to speak.
Dr. Grisez is well aware of this failing and, to his credit, devotes some time
in his introduction trying to correct the impression that these replies give "a
model for the process of pastoral moral guidance" (p. xxii). Yet how can
they be viewed any other way when the reply explicitly addresses not the
reader but the fictitious questioner? The replies do not (directly) give an
analysis of what someone should do in such and such a situation. Rather
they give an answer to the questioner, thought of as a conscientious seeker
after advice.
In the introduction, no doubt in response to criticism generated in
the course of his researches, Grisez asserts "Packaged answers quickly
delivered seldom help people with their actual problems" (p. xxi). Yet the
answers given here cannot but be taken as attempts to answer, with a single
relatively brief answer, the person ' s problem . For the answers are directed
to the questioner! The rhetorical tone suffers greatly from the form into
which it is forced . If one attempts to formulate a reply which is supposed
to satisfy a genuine enquirer with a difficult problem, and must do so in
five pages, it will be extraordinarily difficult to sound other than quick,
glib, smug, harsh or pious, or all of the above.
The title " Difficult Moral Questions" could refer to practical
problems that were perplexing, or to those that were not perplexing but
were emotionally arduous. This book is concerned with the former, though
it would have been helpful to have more discussion of the latter. The
whole question of the arduousness of solution seems underplayed, while
even in perplexing cases it is emotional attachments which make the
solution unappealing in practice. Of course, such gentle weaning of
penitents away from bad habits and disentangling emotionally complex
situations (where moral obligations are nonetheless clear) is a major focus
of genuine pastoral engagement. This sort of gentleness fits ill with the
form , and hence the style of this book, which therefore contributes to its
apparent harshness. None of this is to deny the practical conclusions set
out in the book, most of which I would agree with . It is rather a criticism of
the way such advice can be given and so of the form of the present book. It
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would have been far better to take the CritIcIsms acknowledged in the
introduction seriously and write, for each case, an extended analysis for the
reader - without pretending to meaningful pastoral dialogue with the
questioner.
The style also suffers occasionally from an element of jaundice
with the perceived liberal clerical establishment. Again Dr. Grisez admits
in his introduction that the priests (and religious) in the book are worse
than average, for it is these worse clerics who generate interesting
problems. Yet many of the comments which are made about Catholic
universities, Catholic hospitals, bishops and priests in the book are hardly
necessary. It seems that when Dr. Grisez applies some color to his
examples the colors are often the same. Whether or not the situation of the
American Catholic Church warrants this, it is bad rhetorically. Perhaps
many of these examples are amalgams of true cases. Nevertheless the
preponderance of cases of certain sorts certainly seems to be an attempt to
persuade by rhetoric, rather than argument, and this becomes tiresome.
This is unfortunate, for I imagine there are many who would be interested
in this work (especially this particular work), but would be put off by the
tone.
Having criticized the form, I should add a note of appreciation for
much of the method. One refreshing thing is the extent to which
theological themes shape the general approach. Three large themes could
be mentioned. First, mercy as a principle of Christian action is developed
in many of the questions. In this volume, as in Volume II, it is asserted that
mercy is obligatory, not supererogatory for Christians. Perhaps I could
qualify this by agreeing that the habit or virtue of mercy is obligatory, and
in some situations a failure to be merciful would be an offense against
mercy (when presented by great need). Nevertheless I think that in general,
mercy, like generosity, which is an allied virtue of large-heartedness, makes
no sense unless it is gratuitous . A choice to be just but not (on this
occasion), generous, is not an act against generosity, as seems clear in the
Gospel (Matthew 20, 1-15).
A second key theological concept at work throughout this volume
(and, again, in Volume II) is the notion of vocation. Vocation becomes a
central concept structuring one's obligations to others. This is shown
across a whole range of cases, but see, for a good example, the concept
cropping up in the analysis of advertising. "Thus, morally acceptable
advertising arouses emotions that lead people to consider using a product or
service that might help them fulfill some of the responsibilities of their
vocation, while morally unacceptable advertising arouses emotions that do
not serve that purpose but are more or less directly at odds with it." (p. 633)
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This concept seems to me immensely fruitful for a spirituality drawing
from the insights of the Second Vatican Council.
A third theological concept that seems to playa structural role for
the whole project is damnation. Many questions pay particular attention to
the danger of leaving someone in sin unrepentant. Even victims are
considered, as regarding any complicity they might have, and therefore
what need they might have for repentance and reconciliation. Babies and
unbaptized believers should be baptized if in danger of death. Hell is a real
possibility and charity demands we do all we can, not only to save
ourselves, but also to save others from futility . Thus the spirited attack on
Hans Urs von Balthasar (p. 21-28) is not so tangential as it, at first, appears.
For the real possibility of hell is a strong motivating force behind much of
the book, and indeed the project as a whole.
However, one argument of Dr. Grisez in this area is clearly invalid.
He claims that because Jesus said that those who have done evil will go to
perdition, then there will be people in Hell. If these threats remain
unrealized the Holy Spirit "may have been bluffing, that is, may have
lied ."! (p. 25) But I can say truthfully "Trespassers will be prosecuted" and
yet hope that no one trespasses, and so no one is prosecuted. An officer
may warn the soldiers under his command of the real danger of straying
from the safe path across a minefield, and the danger is real, but he can still
hope that everyone gets across safely. If fear of hell is salutary then
perhaps some are saved from hell by the fear of hell. Hell is a real
possibility for anyone who dies unrepentant in grave sin, yet we may hope
that, by the grace of God, no one will die in such a state. Of course, we
cannot know this, and must not be presumptuous, but neither can we know
that there are souls in hell, and we must not despair, of ourselves or of
anyone else. In short, I think that a healthy awareness of what damnation
means and the real human possibility · of it, are salutary things, and it is
good to see a moral theologian take them on board. However, I do not
think impious those who hope that, in the end, all will be saved.
Many of the questions in this book are genuinely difficult so that
loyal conscientious Catholics might come to different conclusions. Dr.
Grisez himself remarks, "no one who contributed to the book agrees with
everything in it" (p. xxxi).
Nevertheless, for the record, these are a few of the concrete
judgments that, in this reviewer's opinion, are unacceptable:
Surely everyone has a duty to feed himself or herself and care for
his or her own bodily life except in the most extreme cases (of sacrificing
one ' s own life for that of another). Thus it cannot be reasonable to make
an advanced directive suggesting that " if he or she were in that [persistently
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unconscious] conditions, no care be given, in order to save others the costs
and other burdens of giving it" (p. 223).
Is it true that becoming pregnant "has nothing to do with the good
of marriage" (p. 242)? If a technician makes my wife pregnant with her
sister's baby, this seems to compromise the bond of our marriage and the
good of procreation. Pregnancy seems to be an intrinsic element in the
procreative good of marriage, not only an element of child rearing that
might be done by anyone.
Should a young mother attached to her child and no danger to it be
persuaded "to give him up" (p. 187), for what are, presumably, financial
reasons? Dr. Grisez seems to seriously undervalue the good of knowing
one's own self and one's own natural parents, even when this does not lead
to any satisfYing relationship (cf. p. 189-192). He fails to give an account
that would explain why those involved pressed so hard for a legal right to
trace natural parents. In general his account of the natural bond seems too
weak, and of the process of adoption too sanguine (which is not to deny
that it can be the occasion of much good).
I was shocked and thought scandalous the suggestion that a
daughter should be encouraged to make a formal act of renunciation of the
Church (p. 169), for the sake of having a valid marriage (when she would
have been in good faith with regard to the invalid marriage). There was no
account given of the grave wrong offormally breaking communion with the
Church, and what formal cooperation with that wrong would involve.
Finally, the suggestion that smoking was a "grave matter" (p. 60 I)
shows up the cultural context in which it was written, that is, the American
attitude to these things (and perhaps give a new twist to the adage "There's
no smoke without fire."). Though there would seem to be little doubt that
smoking is a vice, a decision about its gravity requires a more sophisticated
account of risk than is given anywhere in this volume, or, with respect, in
Volume II.
There are no questions here involving war and deterrence, murder
and self-defense, or capital punishment (this last to my great
disappointment). Yet these topics may reasonably have been thought
beyond the scope of the book, and have been treated elsewhere. Most
curiously, what used to be thought of as the difficult moral question in
medical ethics, the area of therapeutic abortion, ectopic pregnancy and
craniotomy, is not treated here. This is surely deliberate and in the context
of the subject matter of this book seems an unjustified omission, even
though it has been treated elsewhere.
This book made me appreciate more of what Thomas Aquinas
meant when he said that, "In matters of action, practical truth or rectitude is
the same only in what is common, not in matters proper to some person.
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And even when the practical truth involved is the same, it is not equally
known to all" (Summa Theologiae lallae Q. 94, 4). As we descend from
general principles to particular conclusions, the particular circumstances
become more important and the application of the principles requires more
practical insight. Prudence only comes with maturity and requires the
guidance of holy and wise examples as well as personal experience. It is a
very ambitious project to set about answering so many particular questions,
for it requires a deep understanding of the human practices involved. If I
thought this task sometimes beyond the author, and some of the answers
seemed lacking in nuance, that should not be thought too harsh a criticism,
for serious reflection on so many diverse areas is a standard against which
one would not wish to be measured oneself.
In general this is a useful, serious book, full of insights into many
(if not all) the principles involved in resolving the most perplexing of moral
questions. It is certainly a great contribution to the neglected discipline of
casuistry, and in many places was illuminating for the present reviewer.
My hope is that this format - of many individual questions - will make
this school of thought appealing to a far wider audience than has hitherto
treated it seriously. The construction of the questions themselves is a
service to those interested in exercising their practical reason, and for this
alone the book deserves a wide welcome. This book is a substantial
contribution to the field of moral theology.
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